Rebecca's Thoughts

This was originally published in The Inklings, C.S. Lewis, and Virtuous Friendships: A Book Report!

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle portrays three different types of friendships that people can have[1]. The first type of relationships is utility, or friendships centred around the exchange of things (both physical and intangible) between people. Utility friendships are based on the usefulness of the members in the relationship and the idea of “what can you do for me.[2]” The second is relationships of pleasure. These are between people who often share common interests and is based on the enjoyment of these interest. Pleasure friendships are usually temporary and seen in young people who are guided by their feelings[3]. These can be relationships like, drinking buddies, the people on a recreation sports team, or a friend with benefits situation. Both utility and pleasure relationships are only relationships to the extent that the other is “useful or pleasant[4]” and therefore are not the pinnacle of Aristotelian friendships. That spot is reserved for friendships of virtue, or relationships based on mutual admiration and respect of another. These relationships are developed over a long period of time, and are as Aristotle puts it, a “complete friendship.[5]” Virtue friendships are based on the idea that people do things for their friends, for the sake of their friends and not some personal, or selfish reasons.

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle qualifies these sunaisthesis or “virtuous” relationships by saying; “we agree that someone’s own being is choice-worthy because he perceives that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant in itself. He must, then, perceive his friendship’s being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and share conversation through thought.[12]”

Further on in the book Aristotle says, people will be friends for pleasure or utility, since they are similar in that way. But good people will be friends because of themselves, since they are friends in so far as they are good. These, then are friends unconditionally; the others are friends coincidentally and by being similar to these. Just as with the virtues some people are called good in their state of character, others good in their activity, the same is said for friendship.[15]

Aristotle goes onto say “but if the absence is long, it also seems to cause the friendship to be forgotten; hence the saying, ‘Lack of conversation has dissolved many friendships.’[16]”

[1] Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX,” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1991), pp. 30-69.

[2] Ibid pp. 32

[3] Ibid pp. 33

[4] Ibid pp. 33

[5] Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX,” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1991), pp. 33

[12] Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX,” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1991), 1170b 10, pp. 65

[15] Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX,” in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1991), 1157b, pp. 36

[16] Ibid 1157b, pp. 36